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THE COURT: Okay. Let me first clarify some of the things that I had said the last time because I think Mr. Amabile is right in some regards. First, I'm a well outspoken critic of the Sentencing Guidelines because oftentimes when you add up the column of figures, you get to a number that is so out of proportion punishment-wise to the individual in front of you, but as I said, this case struck me as the same criticism but in the other direction.

When I added up the column of figures, it seemed to be inadequate punishment given the scope of what I saw, but to some degree my position is consistent, I think that the guidelines don't adequately account for individual characteristics, and most of the time, 9 times out of 10 it's because they are over the top in punishment.

This was a situation which struck me differently, and I'm not saying that this is payback for all the times that the guidelines have been excessive, I'm saying that when I look at this from the perspective of the nature of the crime, not the column of figures, this is a more serious variety of mail fraud than I typically see, and that's really ultimately what sentencing is about. You're drawing distinctions, people commit crimes, and there's a range of ways that they commit them and then you look and you say is this at one end or is this at the other end? That's a retribution model, but, nevertheless, that's one way of

looking at it.

I agree with the guideline computation then about the amount, but when I look at that in terms of what Mr. Resteiner did, here's the analysis: I've had lots of mail fraud cases both as a judge and as a lawyer, and typically one measure is how many people were harmed, what was the nature of the harm? Well, this is a harm that is off the top, that is extraordinary kind of harm to people.

This was an abuse of trust. This was an extraordinary abuse of trust, this is not just the abuse of a fiduciary relationship, this was the abuse of a relationship of a church relationship. He was a journal-listed practitioner, a healer. The source of his victims were the people that he came across in the church, so when the guidelines talk about abuse of trust, there's abuse of trust, and then there is extraordinary abuse of trust, and when the guidelines talk about harm, there is ordinary harm, and there is extraordinary harm.

I was thinking of U.S. v. Mueffelman, which is not a case that Ms. Freniere had tried, but in Mueffelman the defendant did what he could to get people who had low credit homes, and at some point he completely misjudged the scheme and he kept on taking new clients, and people ultimately lost money, but there was certainly a period of time when he was working day and night to try to get this business going

and it fell apart.

This is a case in which there is no pretense of investment, there was no pretense of a business. This was taking money from people and not just putting it in his pocket to help a sick relative or to put it in his pocket to help a, you know, troubled son or a troubled daughter, this was putting it in his pocket so that he could have a castle in Switzerland formerly owned by the Shaw of Iran. This is a degree, you know, of harm and a scope of a crime that is, as I said, in the range of mail fraud, this is way at the most severe end.

I recognize that the money laundering issue should not enter into the calculus as a question of law, and I'm not allowing this to enter into the calculus. I agree with you, Mr. Amabile, on reflection that the extradition process is a constitutional process in part, and so when a country doesn't extradite someone because they don't have a comparable crime, I can't consider it, and that to some degree puts a lid then on what this sentence would be because it cannot be the same as it would have been had he been extradited for money laundering.

So the scope of this scheme is in the range of mail fraud far worse than everything I've ever seen. When I looked at comparable cases, and I asked probation to pull comparable cases, in fact, mail fraud is all over the map.

There's no correlation between amounts and sentences so that was not a help to me, and when I looked and I had mentioned that I had sat on the Bleidt case where the individual got 108 months, and that was because it was money laundering and mail fraud, but that it is a substantial mail fraud scheme for which the guideline range of 25 and criminal history 1 is inadequate because this is the far worse end.

Probation in their presentence report suggested an aggravating role adjustment of 4 which had not been in the plea agreement but which reflects a situation where somebody, it doesn't matter whether they were actually supervising people, it includes people who didn't organize, lead, manage or supervise but who, nevertheless, exercised management responsibility over the property, assets or activities of a criminal organization. I actually think that fits, and that would lead to an increase of four levels.

I can't go any higher than that. I appreciate that for a couple reasons, as I said, as a matter of law, I can't go any higher because the sentence has to reflect the fact that he was not extradited. That is the sealing. I can't go any higher because the government's plea agreement, ironically, which is that to some degree when a judge asks to depart without either party framing it, it's like jumping off a cliff without a parachute. I have no framework. The

people who know the most about this are the ones who are then not participants in this, so I can't go any higher than what I said 29-1 is 87 to 108, and, as I said, I can't go any higher than that because, in fact, I can't identify a number that correlates with these other mail fraud schemes. There's really no coherent measure.

I agree with you, Mr. Amabile, that we have spent our time too much focusing on punishment and retribution, and we've lost sight of the rest, but there are offenses that are trumping offenses. There are times when you look at the offense, and you say, you know, that's the most significant thing. The most significant thing is the scope of the offense. The most significant thing is the punishment that is proportional to the offense. The most significant thing is to focus on the offense as compared to other offenses, and that's the fair way of looking at this.

One of the problems with the guidelines is that we stopped giving narratives, we stopped telling stories about why people do what they do, and that's why I asked you, why did he do this? And this offense and this victimization of these people is so extraordinary for which there is no reason that I think the sentence has to reflect society's profound indignation for them, profound indignation, but I'm going to be within the guideline range, and the guideline

range is 87 to 108.

I was about to come out here and say 96 months, but I will not, I think, in deference to the fact that

Mr. Resteiner cooperated to a degree and I think cooperated to a degree in a way that made it easier for the government actually to find out not only about other people but also to find out about the victims, and in that respect, it's much like the Bleidt case as well. That has to count for something. When he was caught, he helped them figure out who the victims are, but I will sentence him to 87 months. It is a guideline sentence with the enhancement of four levels for aggravating role adjustment, and it's a sentence it seems to me that reflects the purposes of punishment including notably retribution.

The sentences in this court for mail fraud range from, really range from probation to 120 months, literally from probation to 120 months, so I couldn't possibly, that wasn't going to help. So the top here, just to reiterate, I can't go any higher, although I would have considered it because I can't have a sentence that reflects in any way the money laundering offenses which are out of this case, I can't go any higher here because I am bound to some degree by the fact that there isn't a party in the case asking for more, and that constrains how far I can go, and I can't go any higher because I can't really come up with a rational

measure of what higher would look like other than my indignation of the case which I understand shouldn't count any longer in sentencing, if it ever should.

So, Mr. Resteiner, would you please stand. I'm going to sentence you to 87 months which is to be on each count of conviction to be served concurrently. I recommend that the Bureau of Prison grant you credit for all the periods of your official detention including the period in Singapore it was from the date of your arrest on February 10th, 2004.

Upon your release from imprisonment, I'm going to place you on supervised release for two years on each count to run concurrently. When you're released, there will be an immigration detainer on you. The odds are that you won't be released to the street, but if you are, you report immediately to probation in the district to which you've been released. You're to make restitution to the victims listed in the chart that will be attached to the judgment in the amount of \$33,949,762. Interest will be waived.

Payment shall be made to the Clerk of the U.S.

District Court for transfer to the various victims in the amounts specified by the chart. I endorse the U.S.

Attorney's efforts to get the proceeds from the SEC action applied to this case, and to the extent that there's anything that this Court can do to effectuate that, I will

do.

Any payment made that is not payment in full shall be divided proportionately among the victims named. The restitution shall be paid immediately. Any balance remaining upon the defendant's release from incarceration shall be paid according to a repayment schedule. Should you change your mailing or residence address, this really assumes you'll get out, but, as I said, you're likely deported, if your mailing address changes, you have to let the U.S. Attorney's Office know while any portion of restitution remains unpaid.

I will not impose a fine because you're not able to pay a fine, and a fine would take away from the money due the victims in this case. If you wind up on supervised release, while on supervised release, you are not to commit another federal, state or local crime. I will not require DNA collection at all. The issue is pending in court, and I agree with Judge Keeton that we shouldn't be collecting DNA.

You're to comply with the standard conditions, and, in addition, you're prohibited from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon. If ordered deported, you're to leave the U.S. and not return without the prior permission of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. As I said, you're to pay the balance of the

restitution. You're prohibited from incurring new credit charges without the approval of probation while any financial obligation remains outstanding, and you're to give probation access to financial information which may be shared with the financial litigation unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office. There's a special assessment of \$700 which shall be due immediately.

So it is a higher sentence than the parties have jointly recommended, but it is a sentence that I think adequately, well, under the circumstances adequately reflects the purposes of punishment. As I said, I couldn't envision mail fraud that wreaked more havock on people's lives without any imaginable reason than this, and it seems to me that you needed to be sentenced in a way that reflected that.